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SAFE AT HOME, BUT BETTER BUCKLE UP ON
THE ROAD-SUPREME COURT SEARCH AND
SEIZURE DECISIONS, 2000-2001 TERM
Stanley E. Adelman*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,'
guarantees that "Itihe right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated."2 Where a search or seizure is found to
be unreasonable, the law provides a remedy in criminal cases in the
form of suppression of evidence, which often leads to the dismissal of
criminal charges. The Federal Civil Rights Act3 also provides a civil
remedy in damages for an unreasonable search or seizure.
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has typically granted law
enforcement officers the greatest leeway and has been most apt to find a
search or seizure to be "reasonable" in cases involving searches of or
seizures from motor vehicles.4 In contrast, the Court has tended to
afford the greatest measure of Fourth Amendment protection to
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law, and
Adjunct Faculty Member, University of Arkansas School of Law. J.D., New York University
School of Law; BA., Columbia University. This article was prepared for the Symposium,
2000-2001 Supreme Court Review, at The University of Tulsa on November 30, 2001. The
author gratefully acknowledges Barbara G. Phelps, J.D. expected 2001, The University of
Tulsa College of Law, whose able research and editorial assistance contributed to the
writing of this article.
1. Wolfv. Colo., 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The term seizure applies to the arrest and temporary
detention of crime suspects (i.e., seizures of the person), as well as to the impounding of
their property for evidentiary purposes. Therefore, virtually any arrest, detention, or
search by a law enforcement officer can become the focus of a Fourth Amendment
challenge.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
4. See e.g. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) ("One has a lesser expectation
of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as
one's residence or as the repository of personal effects."); S.D. v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,
367 (1976) ("[Warrantless examinations of automobiles have been upheld in
circumstances in which a search of a home or office would not.... [The inherent
mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical
necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.")
347
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individuals in cases involving searches of or seizures from their houses
or other dwellings.5
This article reviews seven search and seizure decisions from the
Supreme Court's recently completed 2000-2001 term. Three of these
cases were reviews of criminal suppression decisions; the other four
involved reviews of decisions in Section 1983 civil rights actions. In
three of these cases, the individual prevailed against the Government; in
the other four, the Government prevailed. Although these cases do not
break much new doctrinal ground, the cases where the individuals
prevailed against governmental power show the Court's continued
reverence for the sanctity of the home, most forcefully expressed in Kyllo
v. United States,6 and its willingness to respond in those hard-to-predict
cases where the action of law enforcement officials tweaks the
conscience of the Court.
7
Although it is difficult to find some common thread in doctrine or
policy to somehow bind all these seemingly unrelated decisions together,
the three Fourth Amendment cases where the individual prevailed
against the government all, significantly, involved non-traditional law
enforcement initiatives in the "War on Drugs." If there is any consistent
message or theme from last term's search and seizure decisions, it is
that notwithstanding the Court's generally very friendly posture toward
law enforcement, it will still closely scrutinize drug enforcement
innovations which brush aside the Court's long-standing solicitude for
the privacy of the home or its still-standing distrust of drug detection
methods that do not require probable cause or individualized suspicion.
II. THE CASES
For ease of reference (and in case you wish to read no farther), the
cases discussed in this article and their holdings are as follows:
A. Kyllo v. United States-use of thermal imaging device on
exterior wall of house to detect infrared radiation that would
indicate growing of marijuana plants inside the house held, 5-
4, to be a "search" which is presumptively unreasonable if done
without a warrant.8
B. Ferguson v. City of Charleston 9-public hospital program of
5. See e.g. U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (acknowledging the
sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment
protection"); Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (observing that the right to be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion in one's own home stands "[alt the very core" of
the Fourth Amendment).
6. 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001).
7. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32 (2000).
8. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2046-47.
9. 532 U.S. 1281 (2001).
348 [Vol. 37:347
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testing of pregnant patients' urine for presence of cocaine and
providing positive test results to police for purposes of arrest
and prosecution held, 6-3, to be unconstitutional searches,
unless lower court determines on remand that the patients
consented to the searches.' 0
C. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond"-police checkpoint program
(i.e., roadblock) for the purpose of interdicting illegal drugs
held, 6-3, to violate the Fourth Amendment. 12
D. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista'3-the Fourth Amendment does
not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense
committed in a police officer's presence, such as a
misdemeanor seat belt violation which is punishable only by a
fine (5-4 vote).14
E. Arkansas v. Sullivan' -5search of vehicle incident to arrest for
traffic violations, which resulted in additional drug charges,
was justifiable where officer had probable cause for the traffic
arrest (per curiam opinion). 16
F. Illinois v. McArthurl 7-_police officers who had probable cause to
believe that drug suspect had hidden marijuana in his home
and prevented him from entering his home unaccompanied by
an officer for about two hours while they obtained a search
warrant held, 8-1, to have acted permissibly under the Fourth
Amendment. 18
G. Saucier v. Katz' 9-military police officer who intercepted a
demonstrator who was walking toward the area where then-
Vice President Gore was speaking, dragged him away from the
area, shoved him into a military van, and briefly detained him
held, 8-1, entitled to qualified immunity from suit; a ruling on
the issue of qualified immunity, when raised in defense of a
civil rights lawsuit alleging excessive use of force, should be
made early in the case, and involves a determination that is
separate and distinct from the Fourth Amendment question of
whether unreasonable force was used.2 °
This review first considers the Fourth Amendment cases in which
10. IL at 1292-93.
11. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
12. Id. at 47-48.
13. 121 S. Ct. 1536 (2001).
14. Id. at 1557-58.
15. 121 S. Ct. 1876 (2001).
16. Id. at 1878.
17. 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
18. Id. at 337.
19. 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001).
20. Id- at 2159-60.
20011 349
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the individual prevailed against the government.
A. Kyllo
If any case can be called the surprise of the Court's past term, this
is it. Federal agents (of the United States Department of the Interior),
suspecting that marijuana was being grown in Danny Kyllo's home in
Florence, Oregon, used a thermal imaging device to scan the triplex
where Kyllo lived. 21 A thermal imager detects invisible infrared radiation
and creates images of relative heat and coolness in the area scanned-
as described by Justice Scalia writing for the five-member majority, "it
operates somewhat like a video camera showing heat images. "22 The
relevance of thermal imaging to drug detection is that growing marijuana
indoors typically requires the use of high-intensity lamps.
The presence of thermal hot spots may, in combination with other
indicia, furnish probable cause to believe that marijuana is being grown.
Here, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant for the agents to
search Kyllo's home based on their thermal imaging, tips from
informants, and Kyllo's utility bills.23 In their search, the agents found
over 100 plants, which led to Kyllo's federal indictment for
manufacturing marijuana. 24
Kyllo's suppression motion made its way to the Supreme Court,
presenting the question whether the use of the thermal imaging device
aimed at a private home from a public street constitutes a "search"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.25 If yes, then the
warrantless heat scan by the officers would be unlawful unless it could
be justified under a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. If
no, then the officers did not have to have probable cause for conducting
the heat scan.
Justice Scalia wrote the Court's opinion holding the thermal
imaging of Kyllo's home to be a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The Court remanded the case "for the District Court to determine
whether, without the evidence it provided, the search warrant issued in
this case was supported by probable cause-and if not, whether there is
any other basis for supporting admission of the evidence that the search
pursuant to the warrant produced."
26
As its starting reference point, the Court emphasized the
heightened protection under its precedents against unreasonable and,
21. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2039.
22. Id. at 2041.
23. Id.
24. 1I
25. Id. at 2040-41.
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particularly, warrantless intrusions into the home.2 7  "With few
exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is
reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no."2 The hard
question acknowledged by the Court was whether, under Katz v. United
States,29 Kyllo had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the object of
the search, i.e., the infrared heat waves detected by the officers' thermal
imaging device. 30 Without such a reasonable expectation, an act that
might be a "search" in its dictionary sense is not a search at all in the
constitutional sense, and therefore the act falls outside the protections of
the Fourth Amendment.
Although warrantless visual surveillance of the outside of a house is
lawful (because it is neither trespass nor a search), the Court
acknowledged that technological enhancement of the officers' senses
utilized here had allowed them to know or reasonably infer what was
taking place inside the walls of the house.3 ' The Court concluded:
[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without
physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area' [citation omitted]
constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technology in question
is not in general public use.... On the basis of this criterion, the
information obtained by the thermal imager in this case was the product
of a search.
3 2
The majority rejected the contention of the dissenters (Justice
Stevens, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy) that the thermal imager had merely detected heat radiating
from the external surface of the house and had therefore not intruded
into any constitutionally protected area of Kyllo's home:
The interest in concealing the heat escaping from one's house pales in
significance to the 'chief evil against which the working of the Fourth
Amendment is directed, the physical entry of the home.'
33
According to the dissent, the infrared heat waves detected were akin to
garbage left outside the house in plain view or the observation of smoke
27. Id. at 2041.
28. Id. at 2042 (citations omitted).
29. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (concurring opinion of Harlan, J. which has been frequently
cited and followed by the Court).
30. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2043-44.
31. Id. at 2042.
32. Id. at 2043. In so holding, the Court disagreed with the majority of lower court
opinion to the effect that use of a thermal imager to scan a home to detect the heat given
off by grow lights is not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Some lower courts had
analogized the scanning of "waste heat" given off from building walls to garbage left out for
trash collectors or to the odor of drugs given off by a traveler's luggage, to conclude that
residents have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the heat from the lamps that is
detected from outside the building. Id.
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rising from chimney stacks, which may constitutionally be observed and
"searched" without need of a warrant or antecedent probable cause.34
The dissenters also distinguished between the use of surveillance
methods which penetrate into the dwelling premises ("through-the-wall"
technology) and devices, such as a thermal imager, that do not ("off-the-
wall" technology), and regarded the former but not the latter surveillance
methods as "searches" for Fourth Amendment purposes.3 5
The majority rejected the dissenters' distinction between these
methods. In their view, both technologies are potentially threatening to
the privacy of the home, even if at the present state of the art off-the-wall
devices do not directly discern activity within the house but, rather,
provide investigators with only an inference of what is going on inside:
We rejected such a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in
Katz, where the eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that
reached the exterior of the phone booth. Reversing that approach would
leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology-including
imaging technology that could discern all human activity in the home.
While the technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the
rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are
already in use or in development.
36
Further, Justice Scalia rejected in broad and emphatic language the
contention that the technology here was used constitutionally because it
did not detect any private activity in private areas or reveal any "intimate
details."
In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the
37entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.
Finally, in order to protect the core constitutional interest of domestic
privacy as well as provide police with optimum guidance, the Court felt
obliged to draw clear lines here:
We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws 'a firm line at the
entrance to the house.' That line, we think, must not only be firm but also
bright-which requires clear specification of those methods of surveillance
that require a warrant .... Where, as here, the Government uses a device
that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant.3 8
One further point of difference (among many) between the majority
and the dissent is particularly worth considering. The dissenters
34. Id. at 2047.
35. Id.
36. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2044.
37. Id. at 2045 (emphasis in original).
38. Id. at 2046 (citation omitted).
352 [Vol. 37:347
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss1/8
SAFE AT HOME
criticized the Court's rule as being "too narrow as well as too broad.
Clearly, a rule that is designed to protect individuals from the overly
intrusive use of sense-enhancing equipment should not be limited to a
home."39 The fact that the surveillance in Kyllo was intended to learn
about activity within the home (even if the method used did not
physically penetrate into the dwelling), is obviously the reason why
Justices Scalia and Thomas sided with the defendant against the
government. The dissenters (at least some of them) seem to be
questioning why the Court's solicitude-even to the point of
zealousness-for personal privacy in the home does not carry over in
any comparable degree to searches and seizures which take place
outside the home.4 °
Although not discussed by either the majority or the dissent in
Kyllo, it is at least arguable that in some situations the use of sensory-
enhancing surveillance technologies, both inside and outside of
dwellings, can in fact be the fi/end of privacy interests by protecting the
innocent from greater investigative intrusions. For example, the use of
metal detectors in airports, courthouses, and prisons, or even drug
sniffing dogs, serves to minimize the need for much more intrusive body
searches of the general public who enter those facilities. And perhaps,
use of a device such as a thermal imager on a residence might serve to
clear the innocent inhabitants of suspicion and obviate the need for
further investigation and intrusion.
In view of the incremental constrictions on the exclusionary rule
that have occurred over the years since the Court first made the rule
binding on the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 41 the Ky~lo decision qualifies as a
bit of a surprise, especially given the fairly minimal degree of actual
intrusion that occurred in that case, and as a reassurance to at least
some skeptics 42 that the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule,
if not totally alive and well, are still breathing inside the walls of our
nation's houses.
39. Id. at 2051 (citing Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), "The Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places").
40. Id. at 2048.
41. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (state
prisoner may not seek federal habeas corpus relief on ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at trial, so long as state has provided an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of the Fourth Amendment claim); U.S. v. Havens, 446
U.S. 620 (1980) (unlawfully seized evidence may be used at trial for impeachment
purposes); U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (recognizing a "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule where officers have acted reasonably in reliance on a judicially issued
warrant).
42. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 928-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ([Iln case after case, I have
witnessed the Court's gradual but determined strangulation of the rule. It now appears
that the Court's victory over the Fourth Amendment is complete.").
2001l 353
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B. Ferguson
In Ferguson, the Court struck down a program, jointly developed by
the City Solicitor of Charleston, South Carolina and staff members of a
public hospital operated by the Medical University of South Carolina, to
test pregnant women being treated at the hospital for drug use and to
arrest and prosecute those patients who tested positive.43 The question
presented to the Court was whether the hospital's performance of the
drug tests was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment if
the patient had not consented to the procedure. 44 The Court also framed
this question more narrowly as whether the State's interest in reducing
the incidence of "crack babies" through the threat of criminal sanctions
to deter pregnant women from using cocaine "can justify a departure
from the general rule that an official nonconsensual search is
unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant."45
Under the hospital's initial program, the hospital performed drug
screens on urine samples from maternity patients who were suspected of
cocaine use, and referred patients who tested positive to the county
substance abuse commission for counseling and treatment.4 6 After this
initial program did not appear to reduce the incidence of drug abuse
among the hospital's maternity patients, the hospital, in consultation
with the City Solicitor, decided to modify the program.4 7 The new
program entailed the identification and testing of suspected drug
abusing patients, and the arrest and prosecution of those who failed to
follow up with substance abuse counseling and treatment 8
The purpose of the program was avowedly the enforcement of the
state's drug laws through criminal sanctions, although the further goal
of the program remained deterrence of drug use among the hospital's
maternity patients. 49 The policy and procedure for implementing the
program included preservation of the "chain of custody" of the urine
samples for use as evidence in criminal proceedings. 50 Patients would be
charged with simple possession if they were 27 or less weeks pregnant,
but with possession and distribution to a minor if they were pregnant for
28 weeks or more.5 l Police were also instructed under the policy to
43. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1284-85.





49. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1290.
50. Id. at 1285.
51. Id. The Court pointed out that under South Carolina law, "a viable fetus has
historically been regarded as a person," and that in 1995 that state's supreme court held
that "the ingestion of cocaine during the third trimester of pregnancy constitutes child
neglect." Id. at 1284 n. 2.
354 [Vol. 37:347
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interrogate arrested patients to find out who had provided them with
their illegal drugs.52
Crystal Ferguson and nine other maternity patients at the hospital,
who were arrested after testing positive for cocaine, filed a civil rights
suit against the City of Charleston and the law enforcement officials and
hospital staff who developed and carried out the test-and-arrest policy.
53
They claimed the urine tests were unconstitutional searches because
they were conducted for criminal investigatory and enforcement
purposes, without warrants and without their consent.5 At trial, the
jury found that the plaintiffs had consented to the urine screen
"searches" and found for the defendants. 55 A divided panel of the Fourth
Circuit affirmed, but did not reach the question of consent. 56 Rather,
the panel upheld the reasonableness of the searches based on the
defendants' second principal defense-that they were reasonable, even
absent consent.57 In support of this position the defendants had relied
on the "special needs" line of Supreme Court cases, which recognize that
in exceptional circumstances, a policy or program of searching without
any individualized suspicion is permissible in order to further certain
important non-law-enforcement governmental purposes.58
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the circuit court's
holding on the "special needs" issue, but, like the court below, did not
reach the question of the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to
consent.5 9 Rather, the Court assumed for purposes of its decision that
the searches were conducted without the informed consent of the
patients. 6° The Court reversed the circuit court on the "special needs"
issue and remanded the case for a decision by the circuit on the consent
issue.61
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, wrote the opinion of the Court.62  Justice Kennedy
concurred separately, resulting in a six-member majority.6 Justice
Scalia dissented, joined in part by the Chief Justice and Justice
52. Id. at 1285.
53. Id. at 1286.
54. Id.
55. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1286.
56. Id. at 1287.
57. Id.
58. See Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug testing of certain
personnel of the United States Customs Service); Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646 (1989) (drug testing of students participating in interscholastic athletics); N.J. v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (warrantless search of student lockers).
59. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1287.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1283.
63. Id. at 1293.
3552001]
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Thomas.64
The majority determined that the urine tests conducted by hospital
staff "were indisputably searches within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment,"65 and, further, that the criteria used to identify the women
to be tested provided neither probable cause nor even reasonable
suspicion to believe that they were using cocaine. 66  The Court then
determined that the hospital's practice of turning over the test results to
police, presumably without the patients' knowledge or consent,
distinguishes this case "from the four previous cases in which we have
considered whether comparable drug tests 'fit within the closely guarded
category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.'"67
The Court also distinguished its prior "special needs" decisions from
the present case on several other bases. First, in the prior cases "there
was no misunderstanding about the purpose of the test or the potential
use of the test results, and there were protections against the
dissemination of the results to third parties."6 Second, unlike the
parties tested for drug use in the prior cases, the hospital's patients
enjoyed a "reasonable expectation ... that the results of those tests will
not be shared with nonmedical personnel without [their] consent. "6 9 But
the "critical difference," in the Court's view, lay in the fact that "there
was no law enforcement purpose behind the searches in those cases,
and there was little, if any, entanglement with law enforcement. " 7 In
this case, however, "the central and indispensable feature of the policy
from its inception was the use of law enforcement to coerce the patients
into substance abuse treatment."71  Where the Court had previously
upheld drug testing of student athletes and customs and railway
personnel on the basis of special needs unrelated to the general purpose
of law enforcement, the Court concluded in Ferguson that given the
hospital program's primary purpose of coercing treatment through the
sanctions of the criminal process and given the extensive involvement of
law enforcement officials, "this case simply does not fit within the closely
guarded category of 'special needs.'
7 2
"In such circumstances," the Court concluded, "the Fourth
64. Id. at 1296.
65. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1287. Justice Scalia (not joined by his fellow dissenters on
this point) disputed this "indisputable" contention in his dissent. See text and discussion
at infra n. 78.
66. Id. at 1287-88.
67. Id. at 1288 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997) (striking down as
unreasonable drug testing of candidates for designated state offices; citing Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656; Veronia, 515 U.S. 646; Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602
(1989) (upholding drug testing of railway employees involved in train accidents)).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 90.
71. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1290
72. Id. at 1291.
356 [Vol. 37:347
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Amendment's general prohibition against nonconsensual, warrantless,
and suspicionless searches applies in the absence of consent."7 3 The
Court did not find the acknowledged gravity of the threat presented by
cocaine use among the hospital's maternity patients, by itself, sufficient
to lower the standards of the Fourth Amendment.7 4
Justice Kennedy, in concurrence, agreed with the majority that the
hospital had acted "as an institutional arm of law enforcement for
purposes of the [drug testing] policy,"7 5 and on that basis therefore this
case was distinguishable from the other "special needs" cases where the
Court had upheld suspicionless drug testing. Justice Kennedy
nevertheless takes the majority to task for its position with respect to the
crucial, and as yet unresolved issue of consent, which was essential to
the result in the Court's prior "special needs" cases:
The consent, and the circumstances in which it was given, bear upon the
reasonableness of the whole special needs program.... Here, on the
other hand, the question of consent, even with the special connotation
used in the special needs cases, has yet to be decided. Indeed, the Court
finds it necessary to take the unreal step of assuming there was no
voluntary consent at all. Thus, we have erected a strange world for
deciding the case.... Had we the prerogative to discuss the role played
by consent, the case might have been quite a different one.76
Justice Kennedy's perplexity is not surprising, considering that in a
case where the jury had specifically found in favor of the defendants on
the issue of consent, the majority in effect deprived the defendants of the
considerable deference appellate courts usually afford to jury fact-
finding.7 7 Instead of presuming, as the jury had found, that consent was
given, the Court presumed the exact opposite for purposes of its
decision, merely because the Court of Appeals had not reached the
issue. A "strange" and "unreal" context for deciding indeed!
Justice Scalia, writing only for himself in the first part of his
dissent, concedes that the hospital's taking of the urine samples might
have constituted an unlawful search, but disputes that the testing of the
samples or the reporting of test results to police was a search.78 In his
eyes, the situation presented in this case is no different than in those
cases where defendants had confided incriminating information to third
73. Id. at 1292.
74. This is the very same conclusion the Court reached earlier in the term in City of
Indianapolis, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), also reviewed in this article, where the Court found the
general law enforcement interest in enforcing the drug laws on the highways to be
insufficient justification to uphold the drug enforcement roadblock at issue there.
75. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1294.
76. Id at 1295.
77. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1999) ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous[.f).
78. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1296.
2001] 357
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parties who turned out to be government informants.79 Not very nice or
honorable, according to Justice Scalia, but neither unconstitutional
under the Court's precedents s ° nor violative of physician-patient
privilege which does not exist in South Carolina.
Justice Scalia concludes Part I of his dissent with the contention
that since the hospital was free to provide the test results to police, with
or without the patients' consent; and since the police had not exploited
any unlawful search, the issue of consent is superfluous and there is no
factual basis for challenging the constitutionality of the drug testing
procedures. Therefore, in Part II of his dissent (joined by the Chief
Justice and Justice Thomas) he would not reach the "special needs"
doctrine either, "since it operates only to validate searches and seizures
that are otherwise unlawful."8 1 However, were they to reach the special
needs doctrine (in other words, assuming arguendo that the urine
samples had been taken and tested without the patients' consent), the
dissenters would apply the special needs doctrine to validate the
hospital's drug testing program.
In the dissenters' view, the testing program was indisputably begun
without law enforcement involvement or purposes to facilitate treatment
of addicted expectant mothers and to protect both them and their
unborn children.82 The fact that a law enforcement purpose was later
added in the hope of protecting mothers and their children did not, in
their view, destroy the applicability of the special needs doctrine.8
3
Justice Scalia's dissent concludes with his distinctive irony.
Although in his view the doctors and nurses and even the police (who
arrested only 30 of the 253 women who had tested positive and only
prosecuted two of them) had acted for a benign purposes,
[ilt would not be unreasonable to conclude that today's judgment,
authorizing the assessment of damages against the county solicitor and
individual doctors and nurses who participated in the program, proves
once again that no good deed goes unpunished. 84
Although his writing (agree with him or not) is a refreshing relief
from the ponderousness of most judicial prose, the Justice protests a bit
too much here. The case is a long way from being decided, and the
imposition of damages against the hospital's "ministers of mercy" as is far
from a sure thing. The issue of qualified immunity is not mentioned
anywhere in the various opinions in Ferguson. But given the availability
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1297 (citing among other cases Hoffa v. U.S., 385 U.S. 293 (1966)).
81. Id. at 1299.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1299-1300.
84. Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1302.
85. Id. at 1296 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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of qualified immunity to individual civil rights defendants who have not
"86
acted in violation of "clearly established rights," such a defense would
seem to have a substantial likelihood of success. The very fact the
Supreme Court itself wasn't able to clearly resolve the legal issues
presented in Ferguson (maybe, after remand and further litigation this
case will ultimately be known as Ferguson I) suggests that the relevant
law is not yet "clearly established," in which case the defendants should
be shielded by qualified immunity even if their actions are ultimately
found to have been unconstitutional . Even absent qualified immunity,
it is still altogether possible that the lower courts may decide the consent
issue in the defendants' favor. In sum, there is no judgment against the
defendants, and the plaintiffs' path to ever recovering one remains
blocked by substantial, perhaps insurmountable, hurdles.
To this writer, the hospital's practice, however benign may have
been its intentions, of testing its patients for drugs and reporting those
tests to the police for possible arrest and prosecution violated the
patients' "reasonable expectation" under Katz that the hospital would
use its diagnostic procedures for treatment purposes, not as an arm of
the state's law enforcement apparatus. Their expectation was
reasonable even absent a physician-patient privilege in South Carolina
law. Despite its seemingly flawed methodology, the majority in Ferguson
has correctly distinguished this case from the other "special needs"
cases on the basis of the heavy involvement of law enforcement shown
here. Still, however, there remains the substantial question of whether
the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from suit and
damages, as well as the remanded question of consent. Whatever the
ultimate outcome of the case, the Ferguson decision shows that the
Court takes seriously its self-imposed commitment to "closely guard[]
[the] category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches."
C. City of lndianapolis
In 1998, the Indianapolis Police Department began a program of
vehicle checkpoints with the avowed purpose of interdicting illegal
drugs.88 In the first four months of the program's operation, police
stopped 1,161 vehicles and made forty-five arrests for drug-related
crimes, and forty-nine arrests for unrelated charges.39  At each
86. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Saucier, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (the Court's
most recent word on qualified immunity, also discussed in this article).
87. One wonders, especially in light of the guidance from Harlow and Saucier (that
qualified immunity, when applicable, shields state actors from the rigors of litigation, not
just from the imposition of monetary damages, and should be litigated at the earliest
possible stage), whether and when the defense of qualified immunity was raised in the trial
court and if so, how the trial court treated it.
88. City ofIndianapolis, 531 U.S. at 34.
89. Id. at 34-35.
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checkpoint, police stopped a predetermined number of vehicles (i.e., the
officers operating the checkpoint did not pick and choose which vehicles
to stop), advised the driver that he or she was being stopped briefly at a
drug checkpoint, and asked the driver for license and registration. 9° An
officer looked for signs of impairment and viewed the inside of the vehicle
from the outside while a narcotics detection dog walked around the
vehicle. 9 ' Officers would detain the vehicle and investigate further only
by consent or if they had developed some degree of individualized
suspicion during the initial stop.9 2 Checkpoint locations were selected in
advance based on factors such as area crime statistics and traffic flow;
and the checkpoints generally operated only during daylight hours with
lighted warning signs. The average initial stop lasted two to three
minutes or less.9 4
James Edmond and Joell Palmer, two drivers who had been
stopped at a narcotics checkpoint (but apparently not detained beyond
the initial stop or charged with any criminal offense) filed a federal civil
rights class action against the city and city officials on behalf of "all
motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped in the
future at the Indianapolis drug checkpoints." 95  Their action sought
"declaratory and injunctive relief for the class, as well as damages and
attorney's fees for themselves."9 6  They also sought a preliminary
injunction against the continued operation of the checkpoint program
which the District Court denied holding that the program did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.
97
After the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the checkpoints
were in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and affirmed the Circuit by a 6-3 vote.98 'The Court's analysis
began with the observation that "[a] search or seizure is ordinarily
unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing,"
but that in "only limited circumstances ... the usual rule does not
apply. " 99 The Court cited examples'0 0 from three lines of such cases: the
"special needs" drug testing cases,' 0 ' cases upholding administrative




94. City of Indianapolis, 531 U.S. at 35.




99. Id. at 37.
100. City of Indianapolis, 531 U.S. at 37.
101. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (drug testing of certain personnel of the U.S. Customs




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss1/8
SAFE AT HOME
inspection of closely regulated businesses,1 0 2 and, most particularly, two
cases where the Court had upheld the constitutionality of brief,
suspicionless highway checkpoint stops to combat drunk driving' 0 3 and
to intercept illegal immigrants near the Mexican border. 104
The Court noted that neither Sitz nor Martinez-Fuierte approved a
checkpoint program "whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing." 0 5 The roadblocks at issue in Martinez-
Fuerte involved a separate governmental interest in intercepting illegal
aliens near the national border.'0 6 The roadblocks at issue in Sitz
involved the government's "grave and legitimate" interest in getting
drunk drivers off the road and preventing highway fatalities. 0 7 In both
cases, the gravity of the governmental (non-law-enforcement) interest,
combined with the lack of officers' discretion as to which vehicles to stop
and the relatively brief and modest intrusion entailed by the stops, led
the Court to determine that those programs were constitutional. 0 8
By contrast, the Court had struck down a spot check operation for
drivers' license and vehicle registration in Delaware v. Prouse.109 There,
the Court acknowledged the States' vital interest in ensuring that
licensing, registration, and inspection requirements are being observed,
but struck down the operation because it found that the officer had
exercised "standardless and unconstrained discretion.""0 In dicta, the
Court suggested that a prearranged stopping protocol that left no
discretion to the officer, such as stopping all oncoming traffic, would be
a lawful means of carrying out this function." As glossed by the Court
in City of Indianapolis, "[wle further indicated in Prouse that we
considered the purposes of such a hypothetical roadblock to be distinct
from a general purpose in investigating crime.""
2
The Court acknowledged in City of Indianapolis, as it had in Sitz,
that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint, however brief and relatively
unintrusive, amounts to a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 3 However, the Court did not find a search to have taken
place in Sitz, even with the added element of an "exterior sniff" by a drug
102. See N.Y. v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
103. See Mich. Dept of St Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
104. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543.
105. City ofIndianapolis, 531 U.S. at 38.
106. Id. at 38-39.
107. Id. at 39. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 438 (1957) ("The increasing
slaughter on our highways.... now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the
battlefield.").
108. City of Indianapolis, 531 U.S. at 39.
109. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
110. City ofIndianapolis, 531 U.S. at 39.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 40.
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detection dog. 114 Rather, what the Court found to distinguish the drug
checkpoints in City of Indianapolis from those it had approved in Sitz
and Martinez-Fuerte was its primary purpose of general law
enforcement.1 15 Consistent with the suggestion in its Prouse dicta that
"we would not credit 'the general interest in crime control' as
justification for a regime of suspicionless stops,"" 6 the Court in City of
Indianapolis held that "[blecause the primary purpose of the Indianapolis
narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing, the program contravenes the Fourth Amendment.""
7
The Court rejected the city's attempt to equate its roadblock
program with the Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte checkpoints on the basis of
their common "ultimate purpose of arresting those suspected of
committing crimes:"
If we were to rest the case at this high level of generality, there would be
little check on the ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for
almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose. Without drawing the
line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime
control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions
from becoming a routine part of American life."'
Likewise, the Court also rejected the city's argument that the drug
checkpoint program was justified by its lawful secondary purposes of
keeping impaired drivers off the road and verifying licenses and
registrations:
If this were the case, however, law enforcement authorities would be able
to establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as they also
included a license or sobriety check." 9
The Court cautioned, in conclusion, that its inquiry into the
purpose of a checkpoint involving suspicionless stops "is to be
conducted only at the programmatic level and is not an invitation to
probe the minds of individual officers acting at the scene. 
" 120
114. Id. Here, the majority appears to be refuting the contention of the dissenters that
"the only difference between this case and Sitz is the presence of the dog." Id. at 52.
115. Id. at 40-41.
116. City of Indianapolis, 531 U.S. at 41 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659 n. 18).
117. Id. at41-42.
118. Id. at 42.
119. Id. at 46.
120. Id. at 48. Therefore the Court finds no inconsistency between its holding in City of
Indianapolis and the holding in Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996), that an individual
officer's subjective intentions are irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment validity of a traffic
stop that is otherwise justified. The Court relied heavily on Whren in Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536 (2001) (determining that a civil rights plaintiffs arrest and
pre-bail detention for a seat belt violation were lawful under the Fourth Amendment,
irrespective of the subjective motivation of the arresting officer), and again in Ark. v.
Sullivan, 121 S. Ct. 1876 (2001) (determining that an officer who had lawfully arrested a
traffic violator under state law for speeding could properly conduct an inventory search of
the arrestee's vehicle, irrespective of the officer's subjective motivation for doing so). Both
Atwater and Sullivan are discussed in this article, infro.
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The first part of the Chief Justice's dissent (joined by Justices
Thomas and Scalia) takes the view that on the basis of "blackletter
roadblock seizure law," the Indianapolis drug interdiction roadblock was
indistinguishable from the checkpoints upheld in Sitz and Martinez-
Fuerte.12 1  Based on the criteria set forth in Brown v. Texas122 for
determining the constitutionality of seizures that are less intrusive than
a traditional arrest,123 the dissenters considered the operation in City of
Indianapolis to be constitutional because the stops "effectively serve the
State's legitimate interests; they are executed in a regularized and
neutral manner; and they only minimally intrude on the privacy of the
motorists."124
In the second part of his dissent (joined only by Justice Thomas),
the Chief Justice takes issue with what he considers to be the majority's
inappropriate addition to existing roadblock law here-"a new non-law-
enforcement primary purpose test lifted from a distinct area of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence relating to the searches of homes and
businesses."l2 5 In his view, the Indianapolis program, like the Sitz and
Martinez-Fuerte operations, was properly based, at least in part, on a
legitimate governmental interest (highway safety), and all three
checkpoint programs shared, at least in part, a common ultimate
purpose of arresting law breakers.
26
The Chief Justice would limit the "special needs" test (i.e., requiring
that there be a primary non-law-enforcement purpose) to searches, not
seizures, and intrusions into the home, and observes that there were no
such intrusions in the present case. 127  He considers special needs
analysis to be particularly inappropriate here based on the reduced
expectation of privacy persons have in their automobiles. 128  In
conclusion, the Chief Justice stated, "[tihe Court's opinion today casts a
shadow over what had been assumed, on the basis of stare decisis, to be
a perfectly lawful activity," and then reiterated his view that the stops
were consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
129
Justice Thomas submitted a brief but somewhat surprising
separate dissent. He expressed serious doubt that Sitz and Martinez-
Fuerte were correctly decided:
I rather doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have
121. City ofIndianapolis, 531 U.S. at 49.
122. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
123. Id. at 51. Brown, although not a roadblock case, has been followed in all the Court's
later roadblock cases.
124. City of Indianapolis, 531 U.S. at 53.
125. Id. (emphasis in original).
126. Id. at 55-56.
127. Id. at 54.
128. Id. at 55.
129. Id. at 55-56.
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considered 'reasonable' a program of indiscriminate stops of individuals
not suspected of wrongdoing. 13
0
However, since the respondents in City of Indianapolis did not advocate
overruling either case and Justice Thomas would be reluctant to do so
without the benefit of briefing and argument, he felt that those cases
remained binding precedents and, as stated by the Chief Justice in his
dissent, that they compelled upholding the Indianapolis drug
enforcement checkpoint program.' He therefore joined the Chief
Justice's dissent. 
32
The Chief Justice is probably correct, in an academic sense, to
characterize the Court's explicit requirement of a primary non-law-
enforcement purpose to sustain a program of suspicionless highway
roadblock stops as "new." That "requirement," true enough, appears
only as a suggestion in dicta in Prouse. However, even if not "essential"
to the holding in Prouse, Sitz, or Martinez-Fuerte, consideration of a
significant, legitimate non-law-enforcement purpose was certainly
relevant to the constitutional balancing of interests which the Court
undertook in all three cases-a balancing which had persuaded the
Court in the two prior cases to relax the general requirement that police
have individualized suspicion before stopping vehicles on the highway
based on the substantial non-law-enforcement interests at stake.
The sense in which the Chief Justice is correct is that the majority
in City of Indianapolis simply made an explicit part of its holding the
common thread running through all the Court's decisions that recognize
exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion-that the
police action at issue be in furtherance of some significant public
interest that is not a part of the government's general interest in criminal
law enforcement. The reason why the Court made this requirement
explicit in City of Indianapolis obvious and well stated in Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion-that "[w]ithout drawing the line at
roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime
control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such
intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life"-a concern
that appears to be lost on the Chief Justice. Justice O'Connor and the
other majority Justices here, as they did in Ferguson, are simply, and
appropriately, "closely guarding" the category of constitutionally
permissible suspicionless searches and seizures, fully consistent with
the letter and the core purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
This review now considers the Fourth Amendment cases in which
the government's activity or interest prevailed.









Gail Atwater was stopped by a Lago Vista, Texas police officer in
1997 for driving without wearing a seatbelt and failing to secure her two
small children who were riding in the front seat of the pickup truck. 1
33
Both violations were misdemeanors punishable by a maximum fine of
$50.1m Texas law also expressly authorized a police officer to arrest
seatbelt law violators without a warrant or to issue a citation in lieu of
arrest. 1
3 5
Atwater and her husband sued the officer, the city, and the police
chief under the Federal Civil Rights Act, seeking compensatory and
punitive damages, claiming that the defendants had violated her Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.'36
The Atwaters' complaint additionally alleged 137 that when approaching
her truck the officer yelled words to the effect of "we've met before" and
"you're going to jail."13 8 When she told the officer that she did not' have
her license or insurance documentation because her purse had been
stolen the day before, the officer arrested and handcuffed her in the
presence of her "'frightened, upset, and crying' children." 3 9  After a
friend came by to take charge of her children, the officer drove her in his
cruiser to the police station where she was required to remove her shoes,
jewelry, eyeglasses, and to empty her pockets. 40 Officers took her "mug
shot" and placed her alone in a cell where she stayed for an hour until
she was taken before a magistrate and released on bond.' 4 1 In short,
this was a full-scale arrest that could take place for any criminal offense,
except that there is no allegation that she was subjected to a body
search that often occurs when a criminal suspect is jailed. Atwater was
charged with the two seatbelt offenses, to which she later pleaded no
contest and was fined fifty dollars each. The other charges -driving
without her license and failing to provide proof of insurance-were
ultimately dismissed.1
42
The city successfully moved for summary judgment on the ground
that Atwater's arrest was consistent with both state law and the Fourth
Amendment. 43 The Fifth Circuit reversed concluding that an arrest for
133. Atwater, 121 S. CL at 1541.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1542 (They filed their suit in Texas state court, but the defendants removed the
case to federal court.).
137. Id. at 1541 (The Supreme Court assumed the facts alleged in the complaint to be
true for purposes of its decision.).
138. Id.
139. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1541.
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a first-time seatbelt offense was an unreasonable seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that the officer was not entitled
to qualified immunity. 144 However, a majority of the full circuit, sitting
en banc, reversed and affirmed the summary judgment for the city. 145
The full bench concluded under Whren v. United States146 that if (as here)
an arrest is based on probable cause, the court should not, except in
rare circumstances, undertake to balance the interests of the individual
versus those of the government to determine if the arrest was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. 147 Such circumstances, not present here
according to the en banc circuit, might occur where an arrest is
"conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to privacy or
even physical interests." 48  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine "whether the Fourth Amendment, either by incorporating
common-law restrictions on misdemeanor arrests or otherwise, limits
police officers' authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal
offenses."
149
Justice Souter, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas, wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
dissented. 50
After a painstaking review of both English common law (for
guidance regarding "the traditional protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the
framing"' 5 ), and later American law, the Court rejected Atwater's
contention (although finding some authority to support her position) that
the Framers understood the Fourth Amendment as prohibiting
warrantless misdemeanor arrests except in cases of "breach of the
peace. " 152 The Court found "disagreement, not unanimity" among the
common law cases and commentators, and came to the conclusion that
"history, if not unequivocal, has expressed a decided, majority view" that
police need not obtain an arrest warrant for misdemeanor behavior that
stops short of actual or threatened violence.153 Further, the Court was
"not convinced that Atwater's is the correct, or even necessarily the
better, reading of the common law history."154
144. Id.
145. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1542.
146. 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996).
147. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1542.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1540.
151. Id. at 1543 (quoting Wilson v. Ark., 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995)).
152. Id at 1544.
153. Id. at 1553.
154. Id. at 1546. In addition to the common law history, the Court found many examples
in early English and later American statutes (including federal statutes and statutes
366 [Vol. 37:347
20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss1/8
SAFE AT HOME3
The Court then declined Atwater's suggestion, embraced by the four
dissenting Justices, that it "mint a new rule of constitutional law"
forbidding custodial arrest, even upon probable cause, for misdemeanors
that are not punishable by any jail time unless the government can show
a compelling need for immediate detention.'5 5 After doing so, the Court
acknowledged, as any casual reader of the case would, that Mrs. Atwater
got a pretty raw deal. As an established resident of Lago Vista, she
would have had no incentive to flee if she had been given a citation in
lieu of arrest; she was subjected to gratuitous humiliation; and the
officer at best had exercised extremely poor judgment.96 The Court went
so far as to say that "[i]f we were to derive a rule exclusively to address
the uncontested facts of this case, Atwater might well prevail .... [Her]
claim to live free of pointless confinement clearly outweighs anything the
City can raise against it specific to her case."5 7
The Court, however, opted for drawing "clear and simple" and
"administrable" Fourth Amendment rules, which do not require courts to
engage in constitutional review of "every discretionary judgment in the
field." 15 And, bad luck for Mrs. Atwater again, the bright line the Court
chose was to insulate from constitutional review, except in extreme
circumstances, the discretionary decision of the police to arrest where
probable cause exists, even for the most minor of infractions. 5 9 The
Court saw the rule suggested by Atwater as posing a host of questions of
administrability, including uncertainty in the heat of the moment of
arrest as to exactly what charges would ultimately be justified by the
facts known to the officer, and an officer's lack of knowledge at the time
of arrest of factors such as the existence of prior convictions, that could
affect the severity of the charges and the potential punishment. 60 In the
Court's view, "Atwater's various distinctions between permissible and
impermissible arrests for minor crimes strike us as 'very unsatisfactory
lines' to require police officers to draw on a moment's notice," 161 risking
presently in effect in all 50 states) that permit warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not
involving a breach of the peace. Also, the Court cited 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
5.1(b) (1996) which observes that statutes "removing the breach of the peace limitation and
thereby permitting arrest without warrant for any misdemeanor [emphasis in original]
committed in the arresting officer's presence" have "never been successfully challenged and
stand as the law of the land." Id. at 1552.
155. Atwater, 121 S. Ct at 1553. In a footnote, the Court threw the earlier words of
Justice O'Connor (the author of the Atwater dissent) right back at her. Id. at 1553 n. 14
(quoting from her dissent in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 26 (1985), that courts must
be "reluctant... to conclude that the Fourth Amendment proscribes a practice that was
accepted at the time of adoption of the Bill of Rights and has continued to receive the
support of many state legislatures").
156. Id. at 1553.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1557.
160. Id. at 1554-55.
161. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1555 (quoting Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 157 (1925)).
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suppression of evidence or even personal liability under section 1983 if
they guess wrong. 1
62
"Cap[ping] the reasons for rejecting Atwater's request for the
development of a new and distinct body of constitutional law," the Court
alluded to a "dearth of horribles demanding redress," and the failure of
Atwater's counsel at oral argument to cite the Court to more than one
solitary example of "comparably foolish, warrantless misdemeanor
arrests." 163 "We are sure that there are others, but just as surely the
country is not confronting anything like an epidemic of unnecessary
minor-offense arrests."164
Accordingly, the Court "confirmed... what our prior cases have
intimated: .... If an officer has probable cause to believe that an
individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his
presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the
offender."16 5  Applying this principle to the facts at hand, the Court
found no dispute that the officer had probable cause to believe that
Atwater had committed a crime in his presence, and concluded that the
Whren exception 166 did not apply here.
Atwater's arrest was... no more harmful to privacy or physical interests
than the normal custodial arrest.... The arrest and booking were
inconvenient and embarrassing to Atwater, but not so extraordinary as to
violate the Fourth Amendment. 1
67
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's en banc
judgment.16
The dissenters agreed with the majority that the history of the issue
before the Court is inconclusive. 169 They therefore felt obliged to engage
in the Fourth Amendment balancing test eschewed by the majority here,
weighing the individual's interest in privacy versus the governmental
issue at stake here. 170 In so doing, the dissenters found "significant
differences between a traffic stop and a full custodial arrest."'
7
'
While both are seizures that fall within the ambit of the Fourth
162. Id. Although not cited or quoted by the Court in Atwater, the colorful language of
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967),
comes to mind here: "A policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between
being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause,
and being mulcted in damages if he does."
163. Atwater, at 1557 (reciting a newspaper account of a girl taken into custody for eating
French fries in a Washington, D.C. subway station).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See supra n. 155.
167. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1558 (Court's ellipses and internal quotes omitted).
168. Id.
169. Id at 1561.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1562.
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Amendment, the latter entails a much greater intrusion on an individual's
liberty and privacy interests.... [A] motorist's expectations, when he sees
a policeman's light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to
spend a short time answering questions and waiting while the officer
checks his license and registration, that he may be given a citation, but
that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way
[citation omitted]. Thus, when there is probable cause to believe that a
person has violated a minor traffic law, there can be little question that
the state interest in law enforcement will justify the relatively limited
intrusion of a traffic stop. It is by no means certain, however, that where
the offense is punishable only by fine, 'probable cause to believe the law
has been broken [will] 'outbalance' private interest in avoiding' a fuill
custodial stop. Justifying a full arrest by the same quantum of evidence
that justifies a traffic stop-even though the offender cannot ultimately be
imprisoned for her conduct-defies any sense of proportionality and is in
serious tension with the Fourth Amendment's proscription of
unreasonable seizures.
172
In contrast to the "obvious toll" a custodial arrest "exacts on an
individual's liberty and privacy, even when the period of custody is
relatively brief," the dissenters found the state's interest in taking into
custody a person suspected of committing an offense punishable by fine,
but not by imprisonment, to be "surely limited, at best."1' 3 Rather than
"[gyiving police officers constitutional carte blanche to effect an arrest
whenever there is probable cause to believe a fine-only offense has been
committed," the dissenters would require that:
[When there is probable cause to believe that a fine-only offense has been
committed, the police officer should issue a citation unless the officer is
'able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the additional]
intrusion of a full custodial arrest." 74
Such a rule, according to Justice O'Connor, "merely requires a legitimate
reason for the decision to escalate the seizure into a full custodial
arrest.
- 17
In response to the majority's preference to articulate a bright-line
rule here (i.e., that warrantless arrests for fine-only offenses are always
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment whenever there is probable
cause), the dissenters opined that "[wihile clarity is certainly a value
worthy of consideration in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it by
no means trumps the values of liberty and privacy at the heart of the
172. Id. at 1562-63 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)) (citations
omitted).
173. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1563.
174. Id. at 1563-64 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
175. Id. at 1564.
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Fourth Amendment's protections. " 1 76 As an example of an imprecise but
practicable rule in this area, the dissenters offered the Terry stop-and-
frisk rule.
What the Terry rule lacks in precision it makes up for in fidelity to the
Fourth Amendment's command of reasonableness and sensitivity to the
competing values protected by that Amendment. Over the past 30 years,
it appears that the Terry rule has been workable and easily applied by
officers on the street.
17 7
As for the majority's concern with police officers becoming subject to
personal liability under section 1983 if they misapply a constitutional
standard, the dissenters found this concern to be "more than adequately
resolved by the doctrine of qualified immunity."178
Weighing the competing interests presented here, Justice O'Connor
came to the conclusion that "neither law nor reason supports [the
officer's] decision to arrest her instead of simply giving her a citation....
The majority's assessment that 'Atwater's claim to live free of pointless
indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the City can raise
against it specific to her case,' is quite correct. In my view, the Fourth
Amendment inquiry ends there.
" 179
Which is the better view? Both opinions are extraordinarily well
reasoned in law, policy, and history, and acknowledge much of the same
core Fourth Amendment values. The dissent's final point-its concern
with the degree of unbounded and essentially unreviewable police
discretion made possible by the Court's opinion-seems to tip the
balance here. Despite the absence in the Atwater record of a "parade of
horribles," the dissent cites the current national debate over racial
profiling on the highways (also known colloquially as "DWB"-driving
while black) as evidence that "a relatively minor traffic infraction may
often serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing an individual."
8 0
This is not to tar the entire law enforcement community with the same
broad brush, but rather to acknowledge that abuses do occur and that
where they do, drawing too bright a line can put such actions beyond
the reach of the courts to remedy.
Both the majority and the dissenters agree that Mrs. Atwater was
grievously wronged. But only the dissenters would offer her the
possibility of a judicial remedy. In that regard, the dissenters are truer
to the core value of security from unreasonable search and seizure that




179. Id. at 1566.
180. Id. at 1567.
[Vol. 37:347370
24




The Supreme Court again relied on the Whren case in Arkansas v.
Sullivan.181 A Conway, Arkansas police officer stopped Kenneth Sullivan
in 1998 for speeding and having an improperly tinted windshield.
18 2
Upon seeing Sullivan's license, the officer realized that he was aware of
intelligence on Sullivan regarding narcotics. ' 3 When Sullivan opened
his car door in an unsuccessful attempt to locate his registration and
insurance papers, the officer "noticed a rusted roofing hatchet on the
car's floorboard" and then arrested him for "speeding, driving without his
registration and insurance documentation, carrying a weapon (the
roofing hatchet), and improper window tinting."M
"After another officer arrived and placed Sullivan in his squad car,"
the arresting officer "conducted an inventory search of Sullivan's vehicle
pursuant to the Conway Police Department's vehicle inventory policy."1
8 5
Under the vehicle's armrest, the officer discovered a bag that contained
what appeared "to be methamphetamine as well as numerous items of
suspected drug paraphernalia. " 18 6 As a result of the search, Sullivan
was additionally "charged with various state-law drug offenses."
8 7
"Sullivan moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle"
claiming "that his arrest was merely a '"pretext and sham" to search'
him," and that therefore both the arrest and search violated the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments.88 The trial court granted the suppression
motion, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.1 9 On the State's
petition for rehearing, a 4-3 majority of the court rejected the State's
argument, based on Whren, that the officer's subjective motivation was
irrelevant to determining the reasonableness of the arrest and search, so
long as there is probable cause for the traffic stop.' 90
The Arkansas Supreme Court declined to follow Whren on the
ground that "much of it is dicta," and agreed with the trial court that
suppression was appropriate because the arrest was pretextual and
made for the purpose of searching Sullivan's vehicle for evidence of a
crime.' 91 The court did not feel that Whren precluded such a result; and,
alternatively, asserted that even if Whren precluded inquiry into the
arresting officer's subjective motivation, the court was not precluded






187. Sullivan, 121 S. Ct. at 1877.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1877-78.
191. Id. at 1878.
20011
25
Adelman: Safe at Home, But Better Buckle Up on the Road--Supreme Court Sea
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
"from interpreting the United States Constitution more broadly than the
United States Supreme Court, which has the effect of providing more
rights."
192
The United States Supreme Court wasted few words in summarily
applying the back of the hand to the state court on both issues. In a
two-page per curiam reversal, the Court first observed that, as in
Atwater, it was undisputed that the officer had probable cause to arrest
Sullivan. 193 Relying on Whren, the Court then rejected the state court's
conclusion that the arrest of Sullivan, although supported by probable
cause, nevertheless "violated the Fourth Amendment because [the
officer] had an improper subjective motivation for making the initial
stop.
194
The Arkansas Supreme Court's holding to that effect cannot be squared
with our decision in Whren, in which we noted our 'unwillingness to
entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations
of individual officers,' and held unanimously that 'subjective intentions
play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.'
That Whren involved a traffic stop, rather than a custodial arrest, is of no
particular moment; indeed, Whren itself relied on United States v.
Robinson, for the proposition that 'a traffic-violation arrest... [will] not be
rendered invalid by the fact that it was 'a mere pretext for a narcotics
search.'
1 95
The Court similarly made short work of the state court's alternative
holding. "While 'a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose
greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be
necessary upon federal constitutional standards,' it 'may not impose
such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when
this Court specifically refrains from imposing them.'" 19
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Breyer
(the same four justices who had dissented one month before in Atwater)
joined the Court's opinion, but concurred to express the same concern
192. Id.
193. Sullivan, 121 S. Ct. at 1878.
194. Id (citation omitted).
195. Id. (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-13).
196. Id. (quoting from Or. v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975)) (emphasis in original). The
Court in Hass had observed that the Oregon court's statement that it could "interpret the
Fourth Amendment more restrictively than interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court" was "not the law and surely must be inadvertent error." Hass, 420 U.S. at 719 n. 4.
Although the Court's comment smacks of insincere politesse, the possibility seems quite
real indeed that the error was an editing oversight, given that either the Oregon or
Arkansas Supreme Court could easily have insulated its opinion from Supreme Court
review by simply resting its holding, at least in part, on its own state's constitutional
analogue of the Fourth Amendment. Doing so would have furnished "adequate and
independent state grounds" for decision that would preclude review by the High Court.
See Mich v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). If the error was other than accidental, one
can only ask, "What were they thinking?"
372 [Vol. 37:347
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with the potential for abuse that the Arkansas Supreme Court had. 197
The concurring justices noted the state court's unwillingness "to
sanction conduct where a police officer can trail a targeted vehicle with a
driver merely suspected of criminal activity, wait for the driver to exceed
the speed limit by one mile per hour, arrest the driver for speeding, and
conduct a full-blown inventory search of the vehicle with impunity."
198
However, the Atwood dissenters considered the Sullivan case to be
bound by the holding in the prior case "that such exercises of official
discretion are unlimited by the Fourth Amendment.
199
The concurrence noted that the Court in Atwater had relied in part
on a "perceived 'dearth of horribles demanding redress.' 20 0 Taking the
baton from Justice O'Connor's dissent in Atwater, Justice Ginsburg
remarked, "I hope the Court's perception proves correct. But if it does
not, if experience demonstrates 'anything like an epidemic of




In 1997, "Tera McArthur asked two police officers to accompany her
to the trailer where she lived with her husband, Charles, so that they
could keep the peace while she removed her belongings. "202 Officers
accompanied her and waited outside while "Tera went inside, where
Charles was present. "203 "When Tera emerged after collecting her
possessions," she told one officer "who was on the porch ... that she
had seen Charles '"slide some dope underneath the couch.'-
20 4
The officer "knocked on the trailer door, told Charles what Tera had
said, and asked for permission to search the trailer, which Charles
[refused]."2 °5 The officer then sent the other officer with Tera to get a
search warrant.20 6 The officer who remained refused to allow Charles,
who was also on the porch, to reenter the trailer unless a police officer
accompanied him. 20 7 "Charles subsequently reentered the trailer two or
three times (to get cigarettes and make phone calls)," each time observed
by the officer from just inside the door.20 8 The second officer returned in





202. McArUhur, 531 U.S. at 328.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 328-29.
205. Id. at 329.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 329.
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less than two hours with a warrant and searched the trailer along with
other officers.2 °9
During their search, the officers found a small amount of
marijuana, a marijuana pipe, and a box for marijuana under the sofa.21 0
They then arrested Charles for possessing marijuana and drug
paraphernalia, two misdemeanor charges. 21 ' The trial court granted
McArthur's motion to suppress the pipe, box, and marijuana on the
ground that they were all the "fruit" of a seizure which was unlawful
because of the officer's refusal to allow him to reenter the trailer
212
unaccompanied. In his motion, McArthur averred that he would have
destroyed the marijuana had he been allowed to reenter. 213 After the
Appellate Court affirrned the suppression order and the Illinois Supreme
Court denied the State's petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the Fourth Amendment
prohibits the kind of temporary seizure which occurred here.21 4
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's suppression order by
a vote of 8 to 1.215 Justice Breyer, joined by all the other Justices except
216Justice Stevens, wrote the opinion of the Court. 16 Justice Souter, while
217joining the opinion of the Court, also wrote a concurring opinion.
Justice Stevens dissented.21 8
The Court recognized that despite the strong preference that
seizures be done pursuant to a judicial warrant, issued by a neutral
magistrate after finding probable cause,1 9 certain general or individual
circumstances may render a warranfless search or seizure reasonable.
Looking at the present case, the Court found that the exigencies of the
circumstances rendered the officer's actions in preventing McArthur
from entering the trailer alone while a warrant was being sought
reasonable, and therefore lawful under the Fourth Amendment.22 '
The Court considered four circumstances, in combination with each
other, in reaching this determination. First, the police had probable
cause, based on Tara's statements, to believe that McArthur had






214. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 329-30.
215. Id. at 327-28.
216. Id. at328.
217. Id. at 337.
218. Id. at 338.
219. Id. at 330 (quoting U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983)).
220. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 330.
221. Id. at 331.
222. Id. at 331-32.
[Vol. 37:347374
28
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss1/8
SAFE AT HOME
existence of probable cause before the state appellate court and again in
223his brief in opposition to certiorari. Second, the police had good
reason to believe that if given the opportunity to reenter the trailer alone,
he would destroy the drugs before they could return with a search
warrant. 2 A Third, they made reasonable efforts to accommodate
McArthur's personal privacy interests by leaving McArthur's home and
belongings intact and not searching before obtaining a warrant.225 And
fourth, the restraint on McArthur reentering the trailer was for a limited
period of time, less than two hours, and lasted no longer than
reasonably necessary for police to obtain the warrant.22 6 Under all these
circumstances, the Court found the brief seizure of the premises to have
been reasonable. 7
The Court found "significant support in [its] case law" for this
conclusion, including cases where the Court "upheld temporary
restraints where needed to preserve evidence until police could obtain a
warrant. "22 "In our view," concluded the Court, "the restraint met the
Fourth Amendment's demands.
229
Justice Souter concurred to make two points. First, he believed
that at least up to the point where McArthur came out to the porch, the
risk that he would destroy the drugs would have justified police entering
the trailer to make a lawful, warrantless search, which would have been
a greater intrusion than what actually occurred.2 30 Second, Justice
Souter emphasized that "the legitimacy of the decision to impound the
dwelling follows from the laws strong preference for warrants...."231
Justice Stevens, dissenting, would have dismissed the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted. In his view, the Illinois law
enforcement interest in this case was so slight (as evidenced by the
legislature's classification of the small amount of marijuana seized as a
misdemeanor, punishable by a jail sentence of no more than 30 days)
that "this [case] is a poor vehicle for probing the boundaries of the
223. Id. at 334-35.
224. Id. at 332.
225. Id.
226. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332.
227. Id. at 333. It could be argued, although it would not make a difference to the
outcome or significantly alter the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis, that the police
effected a temporary seizure not of the trailer but rather of McArthur, by limiting his
freedom of movement to reenter it, or that a seizure of both McArthur and the trailer took
place.
228. Id. at 333-34.
229. Id. at 337.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 338. In federal courts and most states, the defendant has the burden of proof
if the search or seizure was pursuant to a warrant, but burden is on the prosecution if
police acted without one). Justice Souter concluded that "The law can hardly raise
Incentives to obtain a warrant without giving the police a fair chance to take their probable
cause to a magistrate and get one." Id.
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government's power to limit an individual's possessory interest in his or
her home pending the arrival of a search warrant." 32  Reaching the
merits, however, he would affirm the suppression order in view of the
constitutional "sanctity of the ordinary citizen's home," and in reliance
on Welsh v. Wisconsin2 33 which he reads as holding that "some offenses
may be so minor as to make it unreasonable for police to undertake
searches that would be constitutionally permissible if graver offenses
were suspected."
234
The majority opinion seems to successfully counter Justice Stevens'
sanctity-of-the-home argument by pointing out that the police in fact
respected and protected the sanctity of McArthur's home by refraining
from entering and searching his trailer until they could get a warrant.25
The majority also distinguish the Welsh case on its facts from McArthur
finding that the offense here was more serious than the one in Welsh (a
jailable drug offense, rather than a nonjailable traffic offense), and that
the intrusion here was less serious than in Welsh (where police entered
the defendant's home without a warrant in order to the prevent loss of
evidence, namely, the defendant's blood alcohol level).236
G. Saucier
In 1994, Vice President Al Gore was speaking at an event
commemorating the conversion of the Presidio Army Base in San
Francisco to a national park.23 7  As he began to speak, Elliot Katz
removed and began opening a banner from inside his jacket that
expressed opposition to experimentation on animals, and walked toward
a waist-high fence behind which was the platform where the Vice
President was speaking.2 38
Military police officer Donald Saucier and another officer had been
warned of the possibility of demonstrations that day and recognized Katz
as a person who had protested at the Presidio before.23 9 The officers
intercepted Katz as he reached the fence, "grabbed [him] from
behind .... and rushed him out of the area," half-walking, half-dragging
him.24 ° They shoved him into a nearby military van and drove him to a
military police station, where he was detained briefly and then
released.24' Katz was not injured in the confrontation. 242
232. Id. at 339.
233. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
234. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 340.
235. Id. at 330-34.
236. Id. at 335-36.
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Katz sued Saucier and other officials in federal court pursuant to
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,2 43 alleging that the
officers had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive
force to arrest him.244 The District Court denied Saucier's motion for
summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity, holding that a
dispute existed on the material fact of whether Saucier had used
excessive force in the incident.2 45  On interlocutory appeal from the
denial of qualified immunity,2 46 the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
24 7
The circuit applied a two-step analysis of the qualified immunity
issue. First, the court determined that the law regarding Saucier's
conduct was "clearly established."2 4 The court then looked to see "if a
reasonable officer could have believed, in light of clearly established law,
that his conduct was lawful."249  On this issue the Circuit court
determined that "the second step of the qualified immunity inquiry and
the merits of the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim are identical,
since both concern the objective reasonableness of the officer's conduct
in light of the circumstances the officer faced on the scene."250 On this
reasoning, the Ninth Circuit held that qualified immunity was
inappropriate since, as the District Court had determined, the use of
force was an issue of fact for trial.
25 1
The Supreme Court reversed on a virtually unanimous vote.25 2
Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas wrote the opinion of the Court, holding that the
"reasonable belief' and excessive force issues were to be analyzed
separately, and that Saucier was entitled to qualified immunity under its
242. Id.
243. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that federal officials may be
liable for violating civil rights in the same manner and to the same extent that state
officials are under §1983. Id. at 389. The only difference between a "Bivens action"
against a federal official and a § 1983 action against a state official is more theoretical than
practical-whereas the right to sue state officials for damages comes from the federal civil
rights statute, the Bivens action arises directly from the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution. The key issue in the Saucier case, qualified immunity, is thus analyzed the
same as it would be in an action brought against a state official under § 1983.
244. Saucer, 121 S. Ct. at 2155.
245. Id.
246. Interlocutory appeal is permitted to allow a defendant to challenge a denial of
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds where "the issue appealed concerns]
not which facts the parties might be able to prove but, rather, whether or not certain given
facts show[] a violation of 'clearly established' law." Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311
(1995). This enables defendants who have meritorious appeals to avail themselves of the
purpose of qualified immunity-to avoid the expense and other rigors of defending
litigation to which they are immune, not just to be shielded from damages judgments
should they be awarded after trial.





252. Id. at 279.
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analysis.253 Justice Souter joined in the Court's analysis of qualified
immunity but dissented in part over the result, believing that the case
should be remanded for the lower courts to determine the question of
qualified immunity pursuant to the Court's opinion, rather than the
Court deciding the issue for itself as it did.2M Justice Ginsburg, joined
by Justices Stevens and Breyer, concurred in the Court's judgment,
agreeing that Saucier was entitled to qualified immunity but disagreeing
with the Court's determination that the qualified immunity and
excessive force issues had to be separately analyzed.255
The difference between the majority and the concurring justices
here is not merely abstract and theoretical. It affects when the question
of qualified immunity is to be decided, and if the officer will have to
"stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. "256 The Supreme
Court has "repeatedly stressed the importance of resolving immunity
questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation,"2 57 and a preference
for deciding immunity questions on summary judgment.255 The qualified
immunity issue can be decided without trial, via summary judgment,
more often (though perhaps not all the time) under the majority's
"separate-issues" analysis than under the "merged-issues" analysis of
the concurrence.
The Court stressed that "the requisites of a qualified immunity
defense must be considered in proper sequence."259  The "threshold
question" is much like a Rule 12(b)(6) determination of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted:
"Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do
the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional
right?"2 60 If a violation is made out, "the next sequential step is to ask
whether the right was clearly established. This inquiry, it is vital to
note, must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not
as a broad general proposition.... The relevant, dispositive inquiry in
determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be
clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted."
261
253. Saucier, 121 S. Ct. at 279.
254. Id. at 2164.
255. Id.
256. Id- at 2156 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
257. Id. (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 2155.
260. Id. at 2156.
261. Id. The Court had cautioned in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987)
that all constitutional rights are "clearly established," in some sense, by the Constitution
itself, but that "if the test of 'clearly established law' were to be applied at this level of
generality ..... [p]laintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity that our
cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging
violation of extremely abstract rights. It should not be surprising, therefore, that our cases
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In Graham v. Connor,2 62 the Court had held that because police
officers "are often forced to make split-second judgments-in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation," the
reasonableness of the officer's belief as to the appropriate level of force
should be judged from the perspective of the officer on the scene at the
time of the incident, as opposed to after the fact with the luxury of
"20/20 vision of hindsight."26 Accordingly, the Court stated in Saucier
that "[i]f an officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect
was likely to fight back... the officer would be justified in using more
force than in fact was needed."26 Thus the excessive force inquiry
allows for a reasonable mistake offact by the officer.
The qualified immunity inquiry, however, has the additional
dimension of allowing for a reasonable mistake of law.,
The concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable
mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police
conduct. It is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the
relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual
situation the officer confronts. An officer might correctly perceive all of the
relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding as to whether a
particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances. If the officer's
mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is
entitled to the immunity defense.... Qualified immunity operates in this
case, then, just as it does in others, to protect officers from the sometimes
'hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,' and to ensure that
before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is
unlawful.
265
Thus, the Court concluded that it is possible for a court to find an officer
to have violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting an unreasonable,
warrantless search, but still be entitled to qualified immunity for a
reasonable mistake as to the legality of his actions. 26 6
Applying these principles to the facts presented here, the Court
found that the circumstances "disclose substantial grounds for the
officer to have concluded he had legitimate justification under the law for
acting as he did."2 6 7 In other words, "[a] reasonable officer in [Saucier's]
position could have believed that hurrying [Katz] away from the scene,
where the Vice President was speaking and [Katz] had just approached
establish that the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been "clearly
established" in a more particularized, and hence more relevant sense[.]"
262. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
263. IA at 396.
264. Saucier, 121 S. CL at 2158.
265. Id. (citation omitted).
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the fence designed to separate the public from the speakers, was within
the bounds of appropriate police responses. "2 6 Given the uncertainties
under which the officer was acting at the time (e.g., whether Katz, by
himself or possibly in concert with other persons there, might intend a
threat to the security of the Vice President, and how much force would
be necessary to protect the Vice President and restore order), the Court
concluded,
It cannot be said there was a clearly established rule that would prohibit
using the force [Saucier] did to place [Katz] into the van to accomplish
these objectives.... Our conclusion is confirmed by the uncontested fact
that the force was not so excessive that [Katz] suffered hurt or injury.2 6 9
Consistent with its often stated preference that qualified immunity
be decided at the earliest possible time, the Court held that Saucier was
entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law, and that the suit
should have been dismissed at an early stage in the proceedings. °
Rather than working any substantive change in the law of qualified
immunity, the Court's holding is probably best understood in this
procedural context, that qualified immunity is an issue of law that can
271and should be decided on summary judgment .
Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer concurred in the Court's
judgment that summary judgment was appropriate on the basis of the
material facts of the case that were not in dispute. However, they "would
not travel the complex route the Court lays out for lower courts."
2 72
In their view, the Court here had unnecessarily "doubl[edl" the
qualified immunity test of Graham v. Connor-which would ask
"whether officer Saucier, in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting him, could have reasonably believed he acted lawfully."
273
Both the issue of qualified immunity and the issue of excessive force
hinge, in their view, on this same question.
Under the facts adduced at that stage, the concurring justices
would have granted summary judgment based on Katz's inability to
identify Officer Saucier as the person who shoved him into the van.
Therefore they found that "Katz had tendered no triable excessive force
claim against Saucier. " 274 In other words, "fact-based" summary
judgment should have been granted because Katz failed to establish his
case, leaving it unnecessary for the trial court to reach the "law-based"
summary judgment issue of whether Saucier was entitled to the defense
268. Id. at 2160.
269. Id
270. Saucier, 121 S. Ct. at 2160.
271. Id- at2161.
272. Id.
273. Id. The concurring Justices opined that "The two-part test today's decision imposes
holds large potential to confuse." Id. at 2160.
274. I& at 2162.
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The concurrence shares the majority's preference for resolving
qualified immunity via summary judgment. However, seeing the
qualified immunity defense and the Fourth Amendment claim as turning
on the same question, the concurring Justices would find summary
judgment inappropriate "if an excessive force claim turns on which of
two conflicting stories best captures what happened on the street."
2 7 5
When a plaintiff proffers evidence that the official subdued her with a
chokehold even though she complied at all times with his orders, while the
official proffers evidence that he used only stem words, a trial must be
had. In such a case, the Court's two-step procedure is altogether
inutile.
2 76
Conversely, in their view, "[o]nce it has been determined that an officer
violated the Fourth Amendment by using 'objectively unreasonable'
force.., there is simply no work for a qualified immunity inquiry to
do. .
2 7 7
This is the most analytically complex and difficult case of the seven
search and seizure decisions reviewed in this article. At the end of the
day, one wonders just how much ground separates the majority view
and concurring views, and whether (or how often) the differing analyses
may yield different results in other Fourth Amendment/qualified
immunity cases. The majority in Saucier did not go so far as to say that
the immunity defense in such cases must always be decided on
summary judgment, but that seems to be the logical consequence of the
Court's opinion. The concurrence shares the majority's preference for
early resolution of the immunity question, but identifies at least a
certain band of cases on the broad Fourth Amendment spectrum, where
material facts are truly disputed, in which it believes summary judgment
278is inappropriate.
At first blush, Saucier might seem to be a pro-police decision,
providing police with both a belt and suspenders to keep them "clothed"
with qualified immunity. However, on closer reading this does not
appear to be the case. It will probably require further Supreme Court
case law before it can be said categorically that the immunity defense
must always be decided on summary judgment. Even if that is the
eventual rule, however, it would probably neither favor nor disfavor
police with respect to the substantive law of immunity. Certainly, police
would benefit in those cases where summary judgment is granted,
275. IcL at 2164.
276. Saucier, 121 S. Ct. at 2164.
277. Id. This is the reverse of the majority's approach, which can be stated as follows:
once it is determined that the officer acted on a reasonable belief that he was acting
lawfully, the officer is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and
there is no work for a trial on the underlying Fourth Amendment claim to do.
278. Id. at 2163-64.
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shielding them from having to face the rigors and uncertainty of trial.
However, where summary judgment is denied, they would go to trial
knowing that if the plaintiff persuades the jury that excessive force was
used, they won't have the safety net of qualified immunity underneath
them to protect them from incurring personal liability under § 1983.
Moreover, denial of summary judgment, by inducing the parties to the
settlement table, may be just as dispositive in effect as the granting of
summary judgment.
At most, it can be said that Saucier favors police by allowing them
two bites at the "reasonable belief" apple, one at summary judgment on
the qualified immunity issue and the other at trial on the merits of the
underlying Fourth Amendment claim. In that light, this decision is
arguably more about procedure than immunity.
The law of qualified immunity, and its underlying rationale, are
unchanged by Saucier. Recognizing the dangers, the uncertainties, and
the need to make split-second decisions that are inherent in policing, the
law allows for mistakes to be made and immunizes officers from
personal liability under section 1983 even when civil rights have been
violated, so long as the mistake of either fact or law is an objectively
reasonable one.
III. WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?
The Court's seven search and seizure rulings from last term are an
idiosyncratic lot and difficult to rationalize as parts of any overall
unifying doctrinal trend. However, the Court's voting patterns (if, indeed
there is anything like a "pattern" to be discerned here) are as always
fascinating. As noted in the Introduction to this article, the three cases
in which the individual prevailed against the government all involved
non-traditional efforts in our nation's often quixotic "War on Drugs."
A. Counting noses
These seven decisions, in contrast to a large percentage of the
Court's decisions last term do not show any consistent voting "blocs."
One-third of the Court's 2000-2001 decisions (26 of 79) were by a 5 to 4
279vote. In fourteen of these cases, the Court split identically as it did in
Bush v. Gore,280 with the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas in the majority and Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer in the minority. None of the Court's search and
seizure cases, including the two 5 to 4 decisions (Kyllo and Atwater),
followed that recurring voting pattern.
Two of the seven decisions were unanimous (Sullivan), or virtually
279. David G. Savage, United they Sit, 87 ABA J. 34 (Sept. 2001).
280. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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unanimous (Saucier), as to outcome. In the remaining five decisions,
only the Chief Justice voted to uphold the governmental interest at issue
each and every time. Justices Scalia and Thomas voted in favor of the
government in every case except Kyllo, where their strongly expressed
concern for the sanctity of the home persuaded them to vote in contrast
to their usual strong tendency to favor the government in criminal
matters.
The remaining Justices voted sometimes for the individual,
sometimes for the government, in no readily discernible pattern.
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are often described, with some
accuracy, as "swing" votes, who can sometimes be persuaded to part
company with the more consistently pro-government Justices. In four of
the five split decisions (except for Atwateij, the individual prevailed
against the government if either Justice O'Connor or Justice Kennedy, or
both (as in City of Indianapolis), voted that way. However, the true
"swing" Justice in these search and seizure cases appears to be Justice
Souter, who was the only Justice to vote in the majority in all five cases.
His vote was absolutely pivotal in Atwater, where his finely detailed
analysis of legal history came to the fore in his opinion for the Court's
slim majority. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer voted
most of the time, but not always (and not always in agreement with each
other) in favor of the individual interest.
All of this ultimately futile nose counting simply underscores the
idiosyncratic nature of these search and seizure decisions. That certain
Justices tend to favor either the government or the individual in these
cases is no profound insight. But is there any way to explain or predict
the kinds of Fourth Amendment cases where a majority of the Court has
voted, or might vote in the future, to uphold the individual interest
against the government's interest in law enforcement? A brief attempted
explanation follows.
B. Tweaking the conscience of the Justices and the "War on Drugs"
Five of the seven search and seizure decisions arose out of drug
cases. The two cases where the government prevailed (McArthur and
Sullivan) involved more or less ordinary law enforcement situations -a
traffic stop that escalated into probable cause for arrest followed by an
inventory search (Sullivan), and a response to a domestic incident where
officers who were furnished probable cause (when they weren't even
looking for it) sealed off the premises while they obtained a search
warrant (McArthuJ. The Court had little difficulty in either case
recognizing that an officer has to be able to "do what an officer's gotta
do," in emerging law enforcement situations. Perhaps the officers in
both cases came close to the edge of Fourth Amendment
"reasonableness," but the Court as a whole seems quite comfortable
20011 383
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giving the officers there the benefit of the doubt in doing their dangerous
jobs, where legal lines governing the extent and limits of search and
seizure powers are sometimes less than crystal clear.
In contrast, the three cases where the government interest did not
prevail (Kyllo, Ferguson, and City of Indianapolis) all involved non-
traditional drug enforcement efforts where the Court was persuaded that
the government, in its zeal (or desperation) to "do something" about the
problem, had resorted to methods that trample on core Fourth
Amendment values. In Kyllo, the core concern that resonated with the
Justices was the sanctity of the home; in Ferguson and City of
Indianapolis it was the Court's disfavor of searches and seizures that are
not supported by probable cause, or even some quantum of
individualized suspicion.
In Kyllo, the Court put a brake on (but did not halt) the use of
emerging technologies that have the capability of finding out what goes
on inside the walls of our houses. As a result of the Court's
determination that the thermal imaging scan of Kyllo's house was a
"search" for Fourth Amendment purposes, police may not use these
sense-enhancing devices to investigate or to furnish probable cause to
arrest or search within the home; rather, they must first have
independently-acquired probable cause (and, presumably, a warrant)
before using them. One still wonders, however, whether the expectation
of privacy the Court so vigorously protects here tends to vanish when
one leaves home and hearth and ventures out into the world outside.
Ferguson and City of Indianapolis involved neither individually
targeted drug investigations nor fast- developing enforcement scenarios
on the streets, but rather governmental programs that cast nets (i.e.,
searches and seizures in the form of urine tests and highway
roadblocks), without individualized suspicion, for the purposes of
catching and arresting drug offenders. Ferguson also involved the
distasteful element of governmental intrusion into the physician/patient
treatment relationship. By "closely guarding" the category of
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches and seizures as it
has in these cases, the Court demonstrates a regard for the traditional
requirement of probable cause that approaches, even if it doesn't quite
equal, its reverence for the privacy of the home.
As in Kyllo, the plaintiffs in Ferguson and City of Indianapolis
managed to set off a warning bell in the Justices' consciences that basic
freedoms were at risk of falling victim to the War on Drugs, however well
motivated that crusade might be. Considering these cases in the same
term, the Justices may have perceived a certain Orwellian 28 1 spectre
281. George Orwell, 1984 (David Campbell Publishers 1992) ("Big Brother is Watching").
From Justice Scalia's point of view, the "off-the-wall" thermal imager is too close for
comfort to the ultimate "through-the-wal" device, the government telescreen that observes
384 [Vol. 37:347
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abroad in the land that gave them serious pause-Big Brother peering
into our homes with high technology and monitoring our intimate
activities, examining our bodily wastes, and detaining us on the highway
without cause, to see if we have been involved with forbidden
substances.
All in all, Fourth Amendment rights came through this past
Supreme Court term in pretty good shape, probably a lot better than
might have been expected. Justice Brennan 2 2 would be encouraged.
hero Winston Smith's every action.
282. See supra n. 42.
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